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The Party’s turn to public repression:  




Abstract. The intensified and more public repression of civil society in China is part of a 
global shift toward deepened and technologically smarter dictatorship. This article uses the 
example of the ‘709’ government campaign against Chinese human rights lawyers to discuss 
this shift. It argues that the Party-State adopted more public and sophisticated forms of 
repression in reaction to smarter human rights advocacy. In contrast to liberal legal 
advocacy, however, authoritarian (or neo-totalitarian) propaganda is not bounded by 
rational argument. It can more fully exploit the potential of the political emotions it creates. 
Along with other forms of public repression, the crackdown indicates a rise of anti-liberal 
and anti-rationalist conceptions of law and governance and a return to the romanticisation of 
power.  
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In July 2015, the China Daily English edition carried an article titled ‘Lawyers “tried to 
influence verdicts.”’ (Cao 2015). This and other reports discussed a gang of professional 
legal advocates operating out of Fengrui Law Firm in Beijing who, the reports alleged, had 
engaged in ‘hyping up’ legal cases (Legal Daily 2015). Some of their alleged criminal 
activities had occurred in courtrooms, where they had ‘spoken wildly and incoherently’ as 
well as ‘insulted judges.’ Allegedly, they had also used other employees of the firm, as well 
as clients and their friends, family and sympathisers to organise ‘rackets’ outside official 
buildings. Fengrui had, the report claimed, also paid people to participate in these ‘rackets’ 
(Legal Daily 2015)  
In August 2016, after a year of being held incommunicado, four of the members of 
this ‘“rights defence” ring’ were put on trial and convicted of subversion crimes, while 
another lawyer was reported to have been ‘released’ after admitting her guilt. The trials were 
partly televised. In scripted statements read out in the courtroom, and in interviews some of 
the lawyers and legal assistants gave, the lawyers standing trial could be seen renouncing 
their former activism, as well as denouncing some of their colleagues, and thanking and 
praising the authorities. Some of them added that they had been manipulated by China’s 
foreign enemies, and vowed not to let this happen again. (Buckley 2016) 
The trials had involved only government-approved lawyers and not been genuinely 
open to the public – they had an audience, but a carefully selected one; and almost none of 
the defendants’ family, friends or originally appointed lawyers had been allowed to attend. It 
was months after the time of these trials before their friends managed to get back in touch 
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with at least some of those who had been detained in 2015. Of the few individuals able and 
willing to discuss their experience, several disclosed that they had been tortured and forcibly 
‘medicated,’ some before being put through what they explained had been carefully scripted 
and rehearsed ‘trial’ hearings or public confessions, followed by ‘release’ into de facto house 
arrest.1  
The novel phenomenon of ‘TV confessions’ and ‘TV trials,’ the mingling of fact and 
fiction in this context, and the disturbing methods by which such outputs are produced recall 
the coercively enacted self-criticisms and show trials of China’s Leninist-Maoist era; but they 
also reflect a changed 21st century communicative environment and broader tendencies on the 
part of governments to produce and propagate ‘alternative facts.’2 I argue here that in order to 
understand how these methods emerged, how they work, and how they affect rights advocacy 
practices, we need to situate them within a broader debate about the relationship between 
rationality and emotion in citizen-state contention and relate them to a widely observed 
global rise of authoritarian legal and political practices. The visual repression of rights 
advocates discussed here is in some ways a reaction to visual advocacy; but its rationale is 
anti-rational, and thus diametrically opposed to that of human rights, in ways visual advocacy 
cannot be. To make this argument, I first discuss visual advocacy and its special significance 
in a repressive, authoritarian political setting, before turning to an analysis of how Party-State 
repression tried to change the narrative of visual advocacy in the context of the so-called 709 
Crackdown. I conclude by arguing that the turn to visual and other ‘smarter’ forms of 
repression represents a dangerous romanticisation of political power. In discussing this aspect 
this article contributes reflections on the dark side of political emotion to a growing body of 
literature on this subject.    
 
The rise of human rights advocacy  
 
By the time lawyers such as Zhou Shifeng, Li Heping, and Jiang Tianyong faced ‘justice’ at 
the hands of the Party-State, they had accumulated well over a decade of experience of 
human rights advocacy. Some of the most momentous and important recent cases they had 
been involved in were to become the cases the Party-state accused them of working on in the 
709 Crackdown. Its accusation almost invariably focused on the manner of advocacy the 
human rights lawyers had used, at times deliberately obscuring the substance of the 
underlying human rights cases. We need to understand the underlying cases to prepare for an 
analysis of how and why the authorities targeted these cases of advocacy and of what this 
means for the trajectory of law and governance in China. The present section discusses three 
of these cases, which, together, throw a light on how through their case work lawyers and 
rights defenders contest the Party-State approach to human rights and rule of law ‘with 
Chinese characteristics.’ 
Human rights lawyers and other human rights defenders in China have to cope with 
many challenges. Most centrally, the judiciary is institutionally weak, and court litigation is a 
highly controlled process. In cases in which lawyers and lay advocates attempt to help their 
clients sue the authorities, they can find themselves unable to get into court when the court 
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refuses to file their case (bu yu shouli), or meet with refusals to hear legally compelling but 
politically or economically inopportune arguments. In cases in which lawyers defend their 
clients against the authorities (almost always criminal cases), the system is closed against 
them and against the public in different ways. (Halliday and Liu 2016: chapter 3; Pils 2014:  
chapter 4)  In these cases, the lawyers’ clients are almost invariably in custody; and they may 
have difficulties accessing these clients, as well as the case files.  
In criminal trials, in particular, lawyers and defendants may find themselves barred 
from addressing certain potentially crucial aspects of their client’s case – such as the client’s 
allegation of torture to extract a confession – and even when they do succeed in advancing 
such arguments, they may find their points ignored by the court. Lawyers have reported 
consistently not being allowed to present their defence in court when it touched on issues the 
court deemed inappropriate, such as freedom of religion for Falun Gong practitioners. They 
also find it difficult to get evidence relevant to the defence adduced in court.3  Lawyers have 
even reported being stopped from drawing on the visual evidence of the bodies of their own 
clients. In a case where criminal defence lawyers in vain attempted to use the torture scars of 
the defendant to question the reliability of his ‘confession,’  
 
 ‘We told [the defendant], even with handcuffs on -- no matter how -- you’ve got to try 
and take off your trousers to show [your scars from torture] to the judge! But the 
judge wouldn’t let him.’(Anonymised Conversation  #2 2012-5)4 
 
The official criminal conviction rate in 2014, for example, was 99.93%.(Gu 2014; Jacobs 
2015)5 It is very difficult to win cases against the authorities of the state also in other types of 
litigation, and nearly impossible to litigate against Party bodies as such, due to the Party’s 
unclear status within (or vis-à-vis) the legal system. (He 2013) The party-state-controlled 
setting of the judicial process, moreover, makes it difficult to allow for public scrutiny of this 
process. To give an example, even in trials that are nominally ‘public,’ the authorities can 
prevent citizens from obtaining permits required to audit the trial (pangtingzheng). Beyond 
the immediate physical space of the courtroom, the party-state controls official media reports 
                                                          
3 McConville sums up the problems ordinarily affecting the defence in criminal trials as ‘The risk of prosecution 
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research citation methods.  
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number of convicted persons relative to the number of suspects [persons determined to be under 
Straftatverdacht], for robbery, rape and drug related crimes, respectively, was 31%, 15% and 28 % in 2015. 
(Jehle 2015)  The rate of acquittals of accused persons standing trial (Hauptverhandlung) hovered between 3 
and 4 % (Justizministerium Nordreinwestfalen 2015). Many more data, including those compiled by human 
rights organisations on issues with abuse and wrongful convictions, would be necessary to assess the criminal 




and prevents major human rights cases from being reported independently via the widely and 
easily accessible national media.  
The legal profession is controlled by a number of institutions, namely, the Justice 
Bureaux, the Lawyers’ Associations and law firms as well as (as always) the Party. (Pils 
2014: chapter 5)6 Measures that can be imposed on lawyers and law firms range from 
instructions on how to handle a particular case or (in the case of instructions to law firm 
heads) to fire a particular lawyer, to suspension and disbarment or deregistration of a 
particular lawyer or, effectively, an entire firm. All lawyers and law firms are required to 
undergo annual appraisals. As a result of this exercise, a lawyer will be classified as 
‘competent’ or ‘incompetent’ by the authorities. Those who engage in work deemed 
provocative are at risk of being classified ‘incompetent,’ which can lead to being suspended 
or even disbarred. Since the early 2000s, when weiquan or human rights lawyering emerged 
as distinct form of legal practice in China, rights lawyers such as Gao Zhisheng have suffered 
suspension and disbarment in retaliation for their advocacy. (Pils 2006) 
For lawyers willing to brave this inhospitable environment, risks do not only originate 
from the judicial and justice bureaucracies but also, much more ominously, from the Party-
State’s extensive security apparatus, which includes the ordinary police, state security, and 
various other agencies such as, since 2012, the Party’s powerful National Security 
Commission. The security apparatus controls, potentially at least, all aspects of their lives. It 
is not only capable of putting them under surveillance, tracking and following them, 
‘travelling’ or indeed forcibly disappearing them, detaining them under a wide variety of 
legal and illegal detention systems; prosecuting; and torturing them. (Pils 2014: chapter 6) It 
is also able to target any particular lawyer’s social and professional environment by the same 
methods, and lawyers have reported with great consistency that the targeting in particular of 
their children, parents and spouses puts great pressure on them.7 For example, when 
describing how his father once reproached him for having abandoned a safe career and family 
life to ‘fight the Communist Party,’ and how he tried and failed to explain this to his father, a 
lawyer was overcome with the mental image of facing his father. He could not go on 
describing it, and broke down. (Conversation #105 2013-1) 
At least until 2010, at a rough estimate, the authorities of the justice bureaucracies and 
the security apparatus seemed well able to create and maintain effective divisions within the 
professional legal community. Weiquan and renquan (human rights) lawyers tended to be 
stigmatised as radicals, even by colleagues who agreed with their more abstract goals and 
convictions. (Cullen and Fu 2010) Not only professional lawyers, but also civil society 
organisations, including foreign-based ones with offices or staff (or projects) in mainland 
China, kept at a distance from this group of lawyers, as associating with them was understood 
to bring risks of control or persecution. The authorities found it comparatively easy to cut off 
or at least curtail communication with them. As a consequence, Party-State oppression itself 
remained obscure, almost invisible to many. When a major crackdown in 2011 saw more 
lawyers than ever before suffer forced disappearance and torture (Branigan 2011; Pils 2013), 
it seemed likely that the few dozen rights lawyers operating at the time would be effectively 
diminished, if not altogether stopped or silenced, as a consequence.  
                                                          
6 These actors work in accordance with legal rules to some extent; their operation reflects the duality of a ‘State 
of norms’ and ‘State of measures.’ (Fraenkel 1941) 
7 Pils (chapter 5) discusses control by the justice bureaucracy and control and repression by the security 
apparatus (chapter 6). See also O’Brien and Deng (2015).  
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From about 2010 onward, however, lawyers had taken recourse to the power of 
images with increasing savvy, discovering visual advocacy as a strategy and the social media 
as a novel tool for the dissemination of messages. From about that time onwards, the plight of 
rights lawyers began to draw wider public attention. (Halliday and Liu: chapter 7) Cases 
instrumental in this development whose significance has been discussed by other scholars 
include, for example, the ‘Beihai’ case and the Fan Qihang case. In both cases, visual 
recordings of police brutality served a crucial function not only in documenting abuse but 
also in attracting concern and support. In the Beihai case, it was the image of a lawyer 
knocked unconscious by hired thugs that produced this effect. (Conversation #74 2013-1; 
Zhang 2012) In Fan Qihang’s case, the defendant Fan Qihang’s account of particularly brutal 
torture, provided to his lawyer, who bravely recorded it, served this function. (Halliday, 
Liang and Liu 2014; Halliday and Liu: chapter 6; Pils 2014; Cohen and Pils 2010; Wang 
2010, He 2010) While all efforts to rescue Fan failed tragically his case had a sad poignancy 
and significance for anti-torture and anti-death penalty advocacy.8  
 
The use of visual advocacy forms 
 
Cases using innovative advocacy techniques included the wrongful conviction case of 
Leping, the case of evictee resister and criminal suspect Fan Mugen, and the case of human 
rights advocacy for human rights advocates, rooted in  Falun Gong persecution – three cases 
that were to acquire further prominence in the context of the ‘709 Crackdown:’ 
In the Leping case, young men accused of a brutal rape and double murder of a young 
couple ‘confessed’ under severe torture. The defendants were given a ‘death penalty with two 
years’ reprieve’ sentence. Some nine years after the initial conviction, another man, already 
facing the death penalty for another murder, admitted to being the true perpetrator. At this 
point, rights lawyers took on the case, against resistance from the authorities, who refused to 
acknowledge their appointment by the defendants’ families. The families, the criminal 
defence lawyers and sympathising colleagues, videographers, NGO workers, and other 
citizens joined in a variety of activities ranging from informally organised workshops to 
discuss the case as an example of problems with the death penalty, to ‘flash mob 
demonstrations’ outside the Jiangxi High Court Building, to protest the fact that the appointed 
lawyers in this case were not given access to the case files.9 Wu Gan, an activist called 
‘Super-vulgar Butcher,’ who commanded a wide online following, went even further, 
pointing to individual officials he held responsible for case. For example, he displayed an 
image of the President of the Jiangxi High Court wearing a painted Hitler-like moustache. 
(Weiquanwang 2015) A videographer documenting the case featured the detainees, their 
lawyers and families. Some scenes show the lawyers speaking with the families, asking about 
their children and their work, quietly drawing attention to the poverty of the family, their 
helplessness, and their remoteness from the legal process. (Anonymous 2012; Jiang 2016; 
Xing and Liu 2015) 
                                                          
8 One of the lawyers described it as a case of ‘doctoring a dead horse as though it were still alive (死马当做活
马医).’ (Conversation #2 2011-5) 
9 In some pictures of these activities, they can be seen holding banners that count the days they have been asking 
for access to the case file, such as, ‘Jiangxi High Court: Lawyers demand access to case files – Day 7.’ In 
another picture, family members of the detained hold a banner that reads ‘A court not righting wrongs is really 
dark -- Major wrongful death penalty case in Leping!  (冤案不平反，法院真黑暗 / 乐平特大死刑冤案江西高
院律师要求阅卷第 7 天) (Tian 2015).  
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Videography also became a tool of human rights advocacy used in mass grievance 
cases such as housing and land rights cases. From the early 2000s onward, evictees would 
create relatively simple visual records by photographing or video-taping evictions and 
demolitions to create a public record of how the eviction was carried out.10 Soon, 
videographers started capturing the complexity of housing demolitions and land-grabs as well 
as resistance to these measures; and with these efforts sought to challenge the official account 
of a particular case. In the case of evictee Fan Mugen, who had stabbed and killed two 
members of an eviction team who, he contended, had attacked him and his family, his 
lawyers argued that that the crucial part of the recording that would have shown him trying to 
protect his wife from violence. But this crucial part of the police video footage turned out to 
have been lost, according to the police. Advocates were reduced to using other images, such 
as a photo of the -- himself also injured -- Fan Mugen; audio-visual recordings of a seminar 
organised to discuss the case; images and film footage documenting how supporters were 
prevented from entering the court building where Mr Fan is tried; and a commemorative 
gathering on the second anniversary of the incident that led to his conviction. (Boxun 2014; 
Qiao 2015; Yang 2015) Although these efforts were limited by censorship, they were 
important as a challenge to the official view.  
In the ‘Jiansanjiang Incident,’ four lawyers, Jiang Tianyong, Tang Jitian, Wang 
Cheng and Zhang Junjie, had set out in search of their clients, thought to be held in the 
‘Qinglongshan Legal Education Base’ of Jiansanjiang, Heilongjiang Province in the northeast 
of China. (Weiquanwang 2014) The clients had been taken away by the police because they 
were members of the spiritual group Falun Gong. Their lawyers feared that they might be 
tortured. Joined by some other supporters, the lawyers gathered outside a gate where they 
thought their clients might be detained, and held up signs appealing for access to their clients. 
When they posted pictures of themselves online, the police placed them under ‘administrative 
punishment detention’ for ‘disturbing public order’ for 5 to 15 days. In detention, they were 
severely beaten.11 When several of the lawyers’ colleagues and friends travelled to 
Jiansanjiang to protest the detentions in a peaceful demonstration, including more pictures 
circulated via the social media, the police blocked further supporters from joining these 
protesters and, without giving any reasons, or indicating what procedure they were following, 
detained some of the supporters who had already arrived. (Human Rights in Chia 2014; 
Nesossi 2015: 967)  
The Leping, Fan Mugen and Jiansanjiang cases can be regarded as representative 
examples of a wide range of similar cases and incidents between 2010 and 2015. A uniting 
feature in these cases is that people who start out acting as advocates end up as victims, and 
that the incidents of violence against human rights defenders are recorded audio-visually. 12 
Pictures of the unconscious Lawyer Li Jinxing in Beihai (see just above) and of Lawyers 
including Jiang Tianyong showing his bruises from torture in Jiansanjiang were followed by 
the picture of Lawyer Li Jinbin in a chokehold by ‘unidentified thugs’  just outside the gate of 
the court where he had come to represent a client in April 2015 (Chinese Human Rights 
Defenders 2015), pictures of Lawyer Xie Yang with his leg broken by ‘unidentified thugs’ 
after trying to represent the family of a petitioner shot dead by the police The Shanghaiist 
                                                          
10 The police will typically also film the process. An example is He (2010).  
11 One of them, Tang Jitian, later spoke to the BBC about his experience. (Hatton 2015) 
12 For a partial list of violent incidents involving lawyers between July 2014 and June 2015, see Human Rights 
Watch (2015).  
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2015; Human Rights in China 2015; ,13 and the picture of Lawyer Wu Liangshu standing 
beaten, bruised and with half his trousers torn off outside a district court building in Nanning, 
where he had unsuccessfully attempted to file a case and refused to hand over his mobile 
phone ‘for inspection’ on request, after recording his conversation with the officials rejecting 
his application.(Lau 2015)  In some instances, like that of Lawyer Xie Yang, the underlying 
case that had led to retaliation against rights lawyers had already attracted nationwide 
attention; and once attention had been drawn, it also extended to further attempts on the part 
of the authorities to stop Xie Yang. Thus, Xie Yang’s original law firm reportedly asked him 
to quit because he had handled sensitive cases, and when Xie Yang subsequently failed to 
obtain the justice bureau’s approval for registering a change of his law firm, he filed a 
complaint against the Hunan Justice Bureau, triggering a public hearing. Pictures circulated 
online captured hundreds of supporters in front of the court and in the courtroom at his 
hearing, described as ‘extremely intense.’ (Tian 2014; Yuan 2015)  
Advocacy work, joint rescue actions, and advocacy-focused gatherings like the ones 
described above naturally also led to a discussion of the system’s wider perceived 
inadequacies. For example, in the context of forced evictions and land-grabs, some seminar 
participants argued that the nature of the injustices occurring in this context was ‘connected 
to the very nature of the system.’ (Boxun 2014) In the context of seminars organised by a 
loose group of lawyers, academics and activists to address the problem of torture, they 
searched for ways of power imbalance between prosecution and defence by introducing new 
mechanisms and procedures.14 The connection between the use of audio-visual techniques 
and social media on the one hand, and the exposure of wider systemic issues would require 
further study in each case. The openness of audio-visual records along with social media 
dissemination may have allowed for more creative engagement with the political causes and 
further implicatons of these cases. It made clearer that lawyers’ persecution could result in 
producing unjust verdicts or blocking access to justice. Despite the authorities’ intransigence 
and despite a series of crackdowns against them, many human rights lawyers were upbeat; 
they felt ‘unstoppable.’(Johnson 2014)  
The rise of visual advocacy and the use of social media for advocacy purposes have 
been discussed as global phenomena. New communication technologies that allow ordinary 
people to record their daily experience visually and audio-visually has seen the integration of 
such recordings and, indeed, creative uses of them into our everyday lives, as well as in 
certain contexts in the legal process. While some have welcomed unconventional, including 
nonverbal forms of advocacy (Shirky 2008), others have expressed concern about the power 
of images potentially distorting rational judgment -- our ‘normal,’ more verbally-based 
thought process. For example, Porter argues that the legal profession is currently lacking the 
‘finely calibrated tools and rich traditions with which we interpret and argue about language.’ 
Yet, Porter also suggests that we should discuss ‘how to create traditions that will allow the 
law to harness its visual power without sacrificing the virtues of our more staid traditional 
discourse.’ (Porter 2014; also Feigenson and Spiesel 2009; Jewel 2009; Mnookin 2014) The 
‘traditional discourse’ referenced is, of course, that of a judicial process operating on a liberal 
constitutional model. Other scholars, too, have emphasised the centrality of rational 
                                                          
13 Further on the ‘Qing’an Incident’ in Heilongjiang (the case of Xu Chunhe) see Zhao (2015); for independent 
footage of the incident see Boxun TV (2015).   
14 On one such occasion, some argued that the introduction of genuine juries in Chinese criminal justice would 
be a way forward, but not all agreed. (Participant observation, late 2013).  
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normativity in the context of uses of audio-visual media for advocacy purposes. (Gregory and 
Losh 2012; Mackie 2014)15 
The novel uses of advocacy by Chinese human rights lawyers discussed here confirm 
that both evidential-informative and emotive uses of visual advocacy well illustrate that a 
human rights advocate must ultimately, even if they are not working in the judicial setting 
that is the focus of attention of legal scholars, make an argument about that right being 
violated or at risk. Moving an audience to pity, commiseration, or a wish to help is after all 
different from obtaining their acknowledgement that one has been wronged. Visual means 
can be effective in elucidating their wrongs, in moving audiences to understand these, rather 
than manipulating their judgment.  
Yet, qua human rights advocacy, visual advocacy is dependent on the acceptance of 
the rules and principles underpinning human rights and has to stay within the boundaries of 
what these rights (such has expression and free trial rights) allow. Whatever emotion it 
produces, visual advocacy is bounded by rationality, and human rights advocates’ central 
message takes a verbal form. 16 The banners used to seek access to clients and case files in the 
Leping case, mentioned above, are good illustrations. 
In conditions where rational normativity is especially challenged, audio-visual 
expression can be even more important than in settings where both verbal and nonverbal 
messages can be delivered freely. Visual expression is not only better for communicating 
messages which the government would deem ‘sensitive’ or ‘subversive’ if they were put in 
verbal form, and for making otherwise hidden illegality and repression visible, sometimes 
literally by providing visual evidence, for example, of places and processes of illegal 
detention. It can also encourage one to think and express what one would not dare to write or 
be able to publish in a system that practices censorship.  
A message that is deliberately ambiguous can moreover require a kind of active and 
creative interpretation that by itself challenges the passive-receptive attitude engendered by 
government propaganda and censorship. An example for this is the leg-gun action initiated by 
Ai Weiwei around 2014. Via social media tools, lawyers and others posted pictures of a row 
of lawyers in seated position, each holding up their left leg, as though it were some kind of 
firearm. It seemed that Ai was mocking a dance routine used in one of the Party’s 
revolutionary opera classics, but nobody could tell with certainty.17 Because of the 
                                                          
15 Pruce argues that while one important, early context in which images are used are humanitarian and emotive – 
as in the iconic, grim images of Biafra children  -- advocates working in human rights contexts have a different 
task from humanitarian campaigners as it is, in her view, ‘the coercive potency of information [that] has proven 
to be the advocate’s most effective weapon.’ (emphasis added, Pruce 2016: 60). Uses of the visual to ‘assert 
forcefulness’ are more typical of activism than of advocacy – the process of speaking up for another, making 
another person’s case.  
16Precisely because in China, these rights are not protected and no liberal-democratic structure is in place, its 
visual human rights advocates are obliged to spend a greater part of their energy on addressing institutional 
flaws than advocates in other systems, and are more often reduced to creating evidence the institutions ignore. 
Thus, while advocates might be confident that filming an illegal stop and search really will make evidence 
obtained through such illegal conduct valueless in a later criminal process in New York, video-graphic evidence 
substantiating a torture allegation was simply ignored by the judiciary Supreme People’s Court in the Fan 
Qihang case, as discussed earlier. And yet, in this case, the evidence created was still more forceful than in he 
case of the defendant not allowed to display his torture wounds during a court hearing. (Conversation #2 2012-5; 
BBC 2016) 
17 Frizell (2014) makes reference to the CCP opera ‘The Red Detachment of Women.’  Li Hao (2014) cites Ai 
Weiwei as saying that the leg-gun images are intended to oppose abuses of the coercive power of weapons 
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inscrutable oddity and comicality of the pictures and the openness of artistic interpretation,18 
they seemed to defy censorship: there was no definable, verbal message to ban or penalise; 
and yet they were unmistakably subversive. 
In sum, while Chinese visual advocacy emerged as part of a global trend, it took on a 
particular significance in China’s unique institutional context of a limited and dysfunctional 
legal process and pervasive government censorship. It gained in importance as visual 
recording methods become more widely available to ordinary people. In the cases discussed, 
rights lawyers’ visual and social media advocacy could not genuinely substitute for rational 
argument in court. But it could tell stories and communicate concerns that could have been 
the beginnings of a human rights case in more hospitable institutional settings. In using the 
emotional power of the visual and the communicative tools of emergent social media, 
lawyers thus presented novel challenges to the Party-State authorities, in part succeeding  in 
subverting the Party-State intention to take human rights advocacy out of the very definition 
of ‘human rights’  
The authorities initially dealt with innovative human rights advocacy and activism in 
much the same way they dealt with more conventional advocacy. They censored reporting as 
much as possible and tried their best to intimidate and deter would-be participants, clearly 
hoping that they would be able to reduce or slow down the circulation of rights advocacy 
messages by various internet censorship means. But emerging, novel forms of advocacy 
triggered a programme of heavy, concerted, and sophisticated retaliation from the Chinese 
Party-State. Importantly, several of the visual advocacy examples considered above -- the 
‘Jiansanjiang Incident,’ the Leping wrongful conviction case, and the case of evictee resister 
Fan Mugen – figured in the wave of repression that started in in 2015, three years into Xi 
Jinping’s ascendance to China’s leadership; and the repressive methods used copied, mocked 
and expanded some of the methods human rights defenders had started using.  
 
 
The unfolding of the  709 Crackdown  
 
The 709 Crackdown is named after the 9th of July, 2015, the date it began with the night-time 
detention of Lawyers Wang Yu and Bao Longjun and their sixteen year old son, Bao 
Zhuoxuan or ‘Mengmeng’. Bao Longjun and Mengmeng were on their way to the airport; 
Wang Yu was home and managed to send out a few social media messages before she was 
taken away by the police. (Fifield 2015)19 The detention raised alarm, but it was not entirely 
unexpected. Crackdowns or, in official jargon, ‘strike-hard’ campaigns against oppositional 
groups have long been used in China; and such crackdowns have also affected human rights 
lawyers, for example when about a dozen lawyers were disappeared and, tortured in early 
2011. (Committee to Support Chinese Lawyers 2011) At the time of the initial detentions of 
Wang Yu and others, it seemed that the 709 Crackdown would be similar. A difference began 
to emerge only when, over the next few days, hundreds of human rights defenders were 
affected. 
The crackdown mainly targeted groups connected to rights advocacy: rights lawyers 
and assistants connected to Fengrui Law Firm, like Wang Yu and Bao Longjun; and Lawyer 
                                                          
18 Dworkin (1985: chapter 5) argues that even textual interpretation is autonomous (author-independent); but 
text constrains interpretation in different ways.  
19 These messages (July 2015) are on file with author.  
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Li Heping and his colleagues (with some overlap between these groups).20 Human rights 
groups such as China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (CHRLCG) and Chinese 
Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) have put the total number affected at over 300 on their 
websites. It is important, however, to appreciate the wider psychological effects of the 
crackdown on wider circles of lawyers and others connected to the legal system who became 
aware of it.   
In targeting the abovementioned groups, the system clearly selected those rights 
advocates who had effectively reached beyond the boundaries of conventional legal advocacy 
and who – despite the limitations discussed in the preceding section – had done so with some 
success. The Fengrui firm had employed Wang Yu and Bao Longjun as lawyers willing to 
work on ‘sensitive’ cases such as that of Fan Mugen, support fellow lawyers, and engage in 
visual advocacy, as well as campaigners working with these lawyers, such as the activist 
‘Super-Vulgar Butcher.’ Lawyer Li Heping was a veteran human rights lawyer, who had 
worked on cases such as the ‘Leping’ wrongful conviction case, and who had appeared in 
citizen documentaries campaigning to end torture.  
A dozen core targets of the crackdown were held in pre-trial custody for many 
months, initially in conditions amounting to forced disappearance. Within days from the first 
detentions, newspapers and national Chinese television carried elaborate, lengthy reports on 
their cases;21  but they did not disclose where the detainees were held or what exactly the 
charges against them were. Throughout these lawyers’ ordeals the authorities denied them 
access to their clients, mostly on the grounds that the detainees had ‘dismissed’ them,22 and in 
some cases on purported grounds of ‘state security.’(Yang 2016) 
The authorities did not allow other rights lawyers to take up the defence of their 
colleagues. Indeed, some of the over two hundred lawyers and legal workers affected in the 
crackdown, were held for a few hours or days chiefly to ‘warn’ them against supporting their 
colleagues.  For example, one lawyer, who was ’caught’ when getting off a train and 
interrogated by domestic security police from his hometown, who had travelled there to meet 
him, described the following conversation.  
 
 ‘[The police officer] said, “We are warning you herewith, solemnly warning you, you 
are not allowed to take part in this matter in any manner whatsoever.” I said, “What 
do you mean by ‘take part’?” He said, “Any manner whatsoever. Including online 
messaging or reposting messages – none of that. If you don’t listen, you will be a co-
suspect with them.”  
…He said, “if you get involved you’re a fellow suspect with them. And we 
know exactly what you have been doing in the past.”  
…I asked him directly, “do you mean not even if the lawyer’s families asked 
me to act as someone’s criminal defence lawyer -- defending their rights in 
accordance with law, that would be my job as a lawyer.” His answer was clear. “No 
                                                          
20 The latter group included Christian activist Hu Shigen and some of those working with him.  
21 Discussed in detail below.  
22 Some lawyers purportedly ‘dismissed’ refused to abandon their clients. One of these stated, ‘In a situation 
where they are facing the calamity of imprisonment, there is no way [the detained lawyers] would let the 
Lawyers’ Association find a completely unknown lawyer for them [in our stead]. And again, from a legal point 
of view, the Lawyers’ Association can only be approached for a recommendation when the detained suspect 




way. If you get involved, you’re a co-suspect.”’ (Conversation #137-16-1; similar:  
conversations #121-16-1; #138-16-1)  
 
Gradually, it became clear that (most of) the detainees were held under ‘residential 
surveillance in a designated location’ (Article 73 CPL).  As noted earlier, Article 73 gives the 
authorities a mechanism for detaining suspects without access to legal counsel for up to six 
months in cases, inter alia, of suspected crimes against national security such as the 
notoriously vaguely defined offence of organizing, plotting or carrying out the scheme of 
subverting the State power or overthrowing the socialist system’ (Article 105 (1), Criminal 
Law). 23  
While cutting them all off from legal counsel and effectively disappearing them,24 the 
authorities also put some of the detainees on carefully designed and partly scripted public 
display. Thus, as mentioned earlier, the director of the law firm where Wang Yu and Bao 
Longjun had worked, Zhou Shifeng, had been taken into custody shortly after them, was 
shown ‘confessing’ to instigating his employees to engaging in rights advocacy on television. 
(Cao 2015) Wang Yu and Bao Longjun were shown on television too: after some friends 
tried to help smuggle their son out of the country, the authorities caught up with him in 
Myanmar and returned him to China. They then showed Wang Yu and her husband on 
national television, devastated and in tears on getting this news. (China Human Rights 
Lawyers Concern Group 2016) 
Following these mass detentions and the release of the majority of those taken away; 
some six months passed without any news or information on the whereabouts of the detained.  
In January 2016, the authorities announced, finally, in written form that the detainees were 
held under arrest on charges of subversion or inciting subversion. From August 2016 onward, 
most detainees resurfaced: some were ‘tried,’ and some ‘released.’  The official TV reporting 
showed several defendants – lawyers and legal assistants -- themselves affirming that the 
trials had been fair and that their legal rights had been respected throughout.  
For example, on 1 August 2016, Lawyer Wang Yu, who according to the report, had 
been released, was ‘interviewed’ by a central-government-friendly Hong Kong media outlet, 
which released a video recording of the interview on its website. In the ‘interview,’ Wang Yu 
does not mention being held without access to independent counsel for over a year. She 
makes no comment on her altered appearance (to her friends, her face looked puffy and her 
eyes seemed unfocused) and no reference to the terrible shock of learning about her son’s 
aborted flight. Seated in what could be the veranda of a pleasant, lush holiday resort, against 
a backdrop of  tuned into the broadcast during intervals, her quiet voice alternating with soft 
soothing music, she instead speaks of her deep gratitude for the government looking after her 
during the past year, especially when she was diagnosed with illness, and says she has come 
fully to experience how caring and civilised the Chinese justice system is. (Evernote 2016; 
Cohen 2016) After this broadcast, Wang Yu vanished again for many months.  
In the days following Wang Yu’s appearance, several other 709 advocates were 
displayed confessing and repenting their ‘crimes’ of subversion in court. For the most part, 
                                                          
23 On ‘subversion’ and ‘inciting subversion,’ see Teng Biao (2012b); Joshua Rosenzweig, ‘The Sky is Falling: 
Inciting Subversion and the Defense of Liu Xiaobo, in Béja, Fu and Pils,  Liu Xiaobo, Charter 08, and the 
Challenges of Political Reform in China, Hong Kong University Press, 2012, pp. 31-60. 
24 As the detainees were effectively held incommunicado with information on where they were held, they were 
forcibly disappeared in the sense of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance, to which China has not acceded. 
12 
 
the authorities described the detentions that had preceded these statements as measures of 
‘residential surveillance in a designated location’, making use of Criminal Procedure Law 
reforms enacted in 2012. Peter Dahlin, a Swedish national detained for his work supporting 
some of the human rights lawyers, was also put in front of a national television  camera 
‘confessing’ to ‘caus[ing] harm to the Chinese government and hav[ing] hurt the feelings of 
the Chinese people.’(Hong Kong Free Press 2016) All these reports and recordings became 
available online within hours from the original broadcasts. The official reports on China 
Central Television, via People’s Daily, Legal Daily, Xinhua News Agency, Global Times, The 
Paper and other official, i.e. government-controlled media outlets reported the August 2016 
trials, especially. 
The official ‘reporting’ claimed that the 709 trials followed an open and fair 
procedure. They not only used the phrase gongkai shenpan and similar phrases, but also 
provided detailed information on how many people there had been in the audience and on 
domestic and ‘extra-territorial’ Hong Kong and Taiwanese) media representatives who had 
attended. Despite evident flaws, various techniques and strategies were adopted to make the 
government version of the trials more plausible. 25 As friends and family of the defendants 
had been harassed and restrained from going to the court to attend the hearings they produced 
statements by these defendants saying that they did not wish their families to attend – because 
it would be ‘too hard to bear’ or because ‘they are all peasants and would not 
understand.’(Zhongguo Chang’an Net 016; Ji 2016; Liu and Zhang 2016) And while no 
independent foreign media were admitted to the court hearing as such, the authorities created 
a temporary ‘foreign media centre,’ at a location at some distance from the court, where they 
provided workspace, beverages, internet access and a video-streamed version of the trial 
‘transcripts’ on a large screen; the media centre itself was the subject of a national television 
report.26  
By displaying rights lawyers being tried and confessing to crimes, the reports 
evidently served the function of portraying the defendants as subversive criminals. Driving 
this point home, they were supplemented by the publication of some purported trial 
‘transcripts.’27 The ‘transcripts’ only mention the conduct deemed criminal in brief terms, and 
provide legal labels, but little legal analysis justifying these labels.  For example, according to 
the transcript, Lawyer Zhou Shifeng ‘used a law firm as a platform to hype up key cases and 
incidents, and carrying out activities to subvert state power is being handled separately.’  
Lawyer Li Heping (who had not yet been publicly indicted let alone tried at that time) ‘used 
funding from a certain foreign NGOs to engage in activities to subvert state power.’ Zhai 
Yanmin ‘unlawful organized petitioners to make unruly petitions and to stir up trouble in 
order to carry out activities to subvert state power.’ Together, they ‘secretly plotted to subvert 
state power, and put forward systematic ideas, methods, and measures for the subversion of 
state power.’ (Human Rights in China 2016)  
In brief paragraphs, the ‘transcripts’ mention some activities deemed to constitute the 
facts of the defendants’ crimes.28   Amongst the issues and cases mentioned in the 
                                                          
25 Cohen (2016) forcefully makes the point that to say Wang Yu’s ‘confession’ was probably coerced would be 
silly.  
26 For a picture showing the BBC’s John Sudworth, see Fenghuangnet (2016).    
27 Transmitted by social media, on file with author.  
28 One such account, for example, detailed a joint meal including Hu Shigen, Li Heping, Zhai Yanmin, and 
Zhou Shifeng on February 2015. On this occasion, according to the ‘transcript,’ the assembled participants had 
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‘transcripts’ and/or reported in news broadcasts, we find some of the cases of visual advocacy 
discussed earlier on in this article: namely, the Leping wrongful conviction case, the evictee 
resistance case of Fan Mugen, the ‘Jiansanjiang Incident;’ and the case of Lawyer Xie Yang’s 
lawsuit against the authorities after they effectively denied him certification of his right to 
practice. Zhai Yanmin’s conviction, for example, rested inter alia on his contribution to the 
efforts to liberate the four human rights lawyers detained in April 2014 in the context of the 
‘Jiansanjiang Incident.’ The ‘transcript’s’ account is limited to just one paragraph.  
 
 ‘On 22 March 2014 the police bureau of Nongkeng, Jiansanjiang, Heilongjiang 
Province gave certain concerned persons administrative detentions for disrupting 
public order. The defendant Zhai Yanmin, between 24 and 29 March 2014, acted as 
co-ordinator organising people to assemble and demonstrate, hold up banners making 
trouble, and hold silent sit-in vigils in front of the police bureau and the Qixing 
detention centre, unreasonably demanding the release of those detained.  Afterward, 
Zhai Yanmin made up facts and circulated slanders blackening the reputation of the 
government, and maliciously hyped these up online, encouraging lawless persons [sic] 
to incite persons unaware of the true facts to develop hatred toward organs of the 
national government, on behalf of ‘opponents of tyranny and violent government and 
heroes pursuing democracy and constitutionalism.’ (Human Rights in China 2016)  
 
This sparse account contrast sharply with the information, narratives, and images advocates 
involved in the Jiansanjiang case had used earlier. There is no mention here of what 
motivated Zhai to call for release of the four lawyers (‘certain concerned persons’) or of the 
background of the four lawyers’ original advocacy on behalf of their Falun Gong clients 
detained in an illegal ‘legal education centre.’ Neither the ‘transcripts,’ nor any of the reports 
engage in any way with the substance of the legal advocacy cases that had given rise to the 
trials. It would have been difficult, from the official media reports, to make out even what the 
most basic facts and legal issues in any of these cases were.  
 
Propaganda and contestation in the 709 Crackdown 
 
Official propaganda focused on the advocacy methods used by the lawyers (now criminal 
suspects) to draw attention to their arguments and to flaws in the legal process. They dwelt 
particularly on visual advocacy methods and described the advocates as ‘diehard lawyers’ 
and members of a ‘rights defence style criminal circle,’ as mentioned early on. Several news 
reports carried images of lawyers demonstrating outside the Jiangxi High People’s Court, for 
example. Other reports show some of the detained lawyers in agitated postures in court, 
arguing with official staff about the handling of the case or accusations of violations of court 
order; but they provided no background on the cases being heard in court. Overall, the reports 
suggested a mental association between rights lawyering and trouble-making, without 
providing arguments or detailed facts to substantiate their accusations of wrongdoing.  
At the August 2016 trials, so far as they were displayed on television or reported via 
the ‘transcripts,’ not only the defendants but also their government-approved lawyers said 
little, if anything, of substance. They did not challenge the facts alleged – including the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
discussed ‘“how lawyers might get involved in the labor movement” and “how lawyers can get involved in 
sensitive case incidents” etc.’’ (Human Rights in China 2016). 
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subversive intentions attributed to the defendants -, question the crimes of ‘subversion’ and 
‘inciting subversion’ in any way, or raise the defendants’ year-long detentions without access 
to family or friends. For example, when asked if they had any objection to the charges read 
out by the prosecutor, the transcripts records that Zhai Yanmin’s defence lawyer had ‘none.’29 
Zhai Yanmin and Lawyer Zhou Shifeng themselves, moreover, said that they felt deeply 
remorseful. To quote Lawyer Zhou: 
 
“Esteemed Presiding Judge, judges, state prosecutors and my two esteemed defence 
lawyers: you have all been put to so much trouble! Through today’s trial, I have come 
to realise fully what crimes I have committed, and the harm my actions have caused to 
the Party and the Government. I hereby express my deepest repentance toward our 
government! [Bows.] I trust that a trial so replete with fairness and justice and the rule 
of law as this will result in a fair verdict, and that it shall stand the test of history and 
legal scrutiny. I admit guilt and repent, admit guilt and subject myself to the law; and 
I will never appeal!  
I deeply thank Comrade Deng Xiaoping, for it was his revival of the high 
school examination system, and introduction of the Reform and Opening policies that 
allowed me to develop my talent. The second person I wish to thank is Chairman Xi 
Jinping, for making China more powerful through his strategy of ruling the country in 
accordance with law.  
I had not realised how serious the West’s [effort to promote] ‘peaceful 
transformation’ in China was. Confrontation with the facts of my crimes must / should 
sound warning bells for the wider lawyer community and the people’s masses. At the 
same time, to promote my own career and the law firms’ profit, I recruited Internet 
Big Vs30 to be destabilizing factors in society. Once again I truly regret this! I thank 
the court! I thank the prosecutor! I thank my lawyers!’ (Chen 2016; Human Rights in 
China 2016) 31 .32  
 
These accounts, based on real, if selectively used, video-footage and ‘transcripts,’ were 
accompanied by some fictional further materials, released in the wake of the start of the 
crackdown in mid-July 2015. An animated cartoon first circulated via the People’s Daily’s 
weibo (microblog) account (CHRLCG Facebook 2016), for example, portrays ‘diehard’ 
lawyers as rabble-rousers, in the context of a fictitious news programme.  
 
 ‘There is a self-styled group of “diehard lawyers” who specialise in hyping up 
negative public opinion, getting involved in hotly debated cases, and go wherever 
there is a hot issue. They sensationalise, emotionalise, and agitate public opinion; and 
they assemble to create pressure and make big trouble in courtrooms [– this is their 
                                                          
29 Zhou’s defence lawyer’s only contribution to the trial process, according to the ‘transcript,’ was to put some 
questions to his client to ‘ascertain’ that he had not been tortured, that his ‘confession’ had been voluntary,’ that 
he had been ‘brainwashed by Hu Shigen,’and that he had published some comments on labour action. (Human 
Rights in China 2016) 
30 Discussed in Veg (2015) at p. 207.  
31 Translation has made use of Chinese-English excerpt available at Human Rights in China (2016).    
32 Yet as though they had detected a note of unwelcome sarcasm in Lawyer Zhou’s exuberant praise of the legal 
process he had been put through, the authorities subsequently scripted some of what the defendant had said out 
of the written ‘transcript’ disseminated online, even though Zhou’s statement had been broadcast via national 
television, and although some less controlled media outlets such as the South China Morning Post were present 
at the trial, and went on to report on the discrepancies. (Jun 2016)   
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established practice. Their habitual method is to turn small matters into big ones and 
to make big ones explode!’ (No-nonsense TV 2016) 
 
The cartoon features a mock ‘interview’ with a fictional ‘diehard lawyer,’ called ‘Lawyer X.’ 
Lawyer X develops the ‘principles of diehard lawyering,’ as follows:  
 
‘First Principle: no matter what the case, you should work with vulnerable social 
groups. In any cases between the government and an individual, it must be the 
government’s fault. The truth is not important, but you must go for people in office or 
with money; and the best is to take issue with the system. And if you want to be a 
successful diehard lawyer you must make yourself out to be a defender of justice.  
Second Principle: You must pick your cases well. Housing demolition cases 
are best. City management ones aren’t bad either; anyway, you must pick one that has 
to do with the functional [Party-State] departments [职能部门]  
Third Principle: The moment you’ve taken on a case, send out micro-blog 
messages: where there’s a forced demolition going on, what princelings have been 
harming the ordinary people; post that to everybody… how they entrap people and 
how oppression forces people to rebel…When fabricating public opinion, the best is 
to channel it in the direction of “legitimate self-defence.”33  
Fourth Principle: When meeting a criminal suspect, highlight how the police 
are obstructing you; and claim you are already under surveillance and could be in 
danger of your life anytime. You absolutely must make yourself out to be a victim! 
…’ . 
 
In the cartoon, as ‘Lawyer X’ speaks to the interviewer, he is gradually divested of the 
attributes of his professional and personal identity – his pen, his beard, his prayer beads (!), 
and lawyer’s suit vanish one by one, and are replaced by a prisoner’s uniform and cap; at the 
end of the clip, the door of his barred prison cell closes on him, and the ‘news anchor’ 
reappears to conclude the programme. (No-nonsense TV 2016)  
The authors of this animated cartoon allege that rights lawyers fabricate stories of 
oppression and abuse, falsely blaming the government, and aggrandising themselves. The 
authors run no risk of being refuted, since the cartoon story is a fiction; but they make some 
selective reference to fact, as the cartoon includes black-and-white photographs of the 
protests outside the Jiangxi High Court in the Leping case, as well as other cases handled by 
rights lawyers suggesting connections with the script of the 709 trials. Fiction with an 
admixture of facts, a fictitious, discrediting ‘self-description’ combined with the imagery of 
crime and punishment come to substitute for debate about rights lawyer advocacy. The 
authorities can easily afford the substitution, since they either control the protagonist rights 
lawyers, or they at least control any legal process through which their narrative could be 
challenged.34     
Another video titled ‘Colour Revolution’ distributed in the week of the 709 trials, 
visually links images of the lawyers in court and participating in demonstrations with images 
of U.S. warfare in Iraq, Syrian refugees stranded in Europe (China Digital Times 2016). 
Combining dramatic images with stirring music, it suggests that the lawyers were part of a 
                                                          
33 This can be read as a reference to cases like the ‘Fan Mugen’ one discussed above.  
34 Rights defenders did make use of the cartoon to come up with a ‘Ten Principles of Judging’ cartoon that 
substituted the spoken words and subtitles; but it is unclear how many viewers this cartoon was able to reach. 
[Cartoon on file with author]. 
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U.S. based plot to subvert China. Romanticising political power, it also reassures viewers that 
the country will be kept safe under the guidance of the Party, concluding:  
 
‘… year after year, the western forces, led by the U.S., under the banner of 
democracy, freedom and rule of law, create social contradictions in targeted countries 
with the intention to overthrow governments. Their slogans are loud, their lies are 
beautiful; but they will not become facts.’ (China Digital Times 2016) 35  
 
Similarly, other audio-visual and textual output aimed to portray foreign involvement in or 
support for Chinese rights advocacy as subversive infiltration by China’s foreign enemies. 
(Wu Dao Guang 2016; ChinaChange 2016)   
A few months later, in January 2017, lawyer Li Chunfu, held since September 2015, 
was released after over 500 days ‘residential surveillance in a designated location’ with signs 
of serious mental illness (Wang 2016); and lawyer Xie Yang, when finally able to meet a 
defence lawyer appointed for him by his family, provided a detailed account of his torture to 
this lawyer, who decided to publish the news. (Xie and Chen 2017)  
As the months passed, one after another lawyer disclosed details of how they had 
been treated. One lawyer, released after six months, commented that he had effectively been 
forcibly disappeared: held in a locked room with the blinds down, under round-the-clock 
surveillance by two guards, and subject to seemingly endless interrogation by interrogators 
from the domestic security division of the police. He was released only after he provided a 
‘confession,’ ‘statement of repentance’ and promises to desist from advocacy in future, and 
read these out aloud before a camera.  He was asked to state 
 
‘…That I was doing all these things in order to defame [抹黑] the CCP; and also to 
incite subversion of the CCP -- that I had worked as a human rights lawyer in order to 
incite subversion of the government. [Laughs.] Later I privately told [the 
interrogators], “look, I am not that ambitious! I wasn’t thinking that much when 
legally representing clients.” But I had to say these things, because otherwise, they’d 
have made a mistake in handling my case [i.e. in detaining the lawyer on suspicion of 
inciting subversion].’ (Conversation #120-16-1) 
 
This lawyer was released only after he read his ‘confession,’ ‘statement of repentance’ and 
promises to desist from advocacy in future out aloud before a camera. (Conversation #120-
16-1)  
In the summer of 2017, further details began to emerge. Wang Yu, still held under 
house arrest in a remote location and virtually isolated from friends and colleagues 
(Conversation #135-17-1), went public with some details about her experience; including the 
fact that she had been temporarily locked up in a small cage, denied food, and beaten (Wang 
2017). Some ten months later, she was to give an even fuller account of the ordeal preceding 
her August 2016 ‘interview,’ including the many rehearsals and versions that had to be 
produced until the authorities were satisfied. (ChinaChange 2018)  
                                                          
35 At 2’02’’ this clip shows Tu Fu and others in front of Jiangxi High Court holding a banner with the words 
‘Jiangxi Court: Lawyers Demand Access To Case Files’; but their banner is so twisted it is hardly legible. 
(China Digital Times 2016) 
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Concurrently, details began to emerge of a – for human rights lawyers - novel 
technique of forcibly drugging detainees, telling them that they were taking ‘medication.’ The 
use of such fear techniques reminds us that any contestation of the official ‘reports’ and 
propaganda occurred on unequal terms and at great personal sacrifice.  
Lawyer Xie Yanyi, for example, commented as follows on his experience.  
 
‘While in Tianjin, nearly all of the 709 detainees, as I’ve since learned, were forced to 
take medicine. Every day a physician would bring the medicine, and every time they 
would shine a flashlight in my throat to make sure I’d swallowed. It was about four 
white pills each time. They said I had elevated transaminases and that it could be a 
problem with my liver. But I’m a vegetarian. I don’t smoke, I don’t drink. I’m in good 
health and haven’t had any health problems. I’m also not in the habit of taking 
medicine. … I tried reasoning with them several times and refused to take the 
medicine. Then the physician, the discipline officer and the warden had to come force 
feed the pills to me. I had no choice but give in. After about two months the medicine 
stopped.’ (Xie 2017)  
 
Another lawyer who had also been forcibly drugged (being forced to take pills) commented 
as follows on this practice.  
 
‘It made you think you were finished this time. Mentally, it was [the scariest], because 
you couldn’t know [what you’d been given] and so you thought, for sure they want to 
kill you. You won’t get out of here alive. It was only in there that I understood what 
torture really was.’ (Pils 2017)  
 
This lawyer also disclosed that the trial they were subjected to had been carefully scripted 
and rehearsed several times before being ‘held.’ (Pils 2017)  
In an apparent effort to mitigate the public impact of these revelations and to stop the 
human rights lawyer community from further campaigning on this issue, the authorities 
began to lock up lawyers who had worked on their disclosure. In November 2016, Lawyer 
Jiang Tianyong, a veteran human rights lawyer who had participated in the Jiansanjiang 
campaign discussed earlier on, and a close friend of some of the original targets of the 709 
Crackdown, was detained on suspicion of having helped to ‘fabricate’ Xie Yang’s reports. He 
too was put through televised ‘interviews,’ during which he ‘confessed,’ and a television trial, 
which was held in August 2017 (Xie 2017), followed by his conviction and sentence to two 
years’ imprisonment in November 2017. (Rauhala and Denver 2017)  
Jiang’s trial vividly enacted the power relationship between the defendant and the 
representatives of the legal process in the context of  contested propaganda. The authorities 
not only reduced him to answering questions in a manner suggesting that like earlier ones, the 
trial had been scripted and rehearsed. The presiding judge Liu Zhen and judges Su Nanyang 
and Liu Ge, prosecutors Yu Junwei and Wu Fei, and defence lawyers Yang Jielin and Zhen 
Jie, too, appeared to be largely reading from a script full of official jargon, with only minimal 
improvisation.36  
 
                                                          
36 A monitor apparently showing a rolling ‘transcript’ of what is said at the hearing was placed in front of Jiang, 
who kept glancing at it while speaking.  
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Prosecutor:  ‘What was the content of the training [you received abroad]?’  
 
Jiang:  ‘Mostly it was about the western constitutionalist system of the 
capitalist classes [xifang zichan jieji xianzheng zhidu]. It truly made 
me…think that in our country they also should realise the so-called 
constitutionalist system.’  
 
Prosecutor:  ‘How did these trainings affect you?’ 
 
Jiang:  ‘Well, they made me think – they made me hope that in our country, 
the western constitutionalist system of the capitalist classes could also 
be implemented. They made me hope that our country’s current 
political system could change. As a result, this made me – later it made 
me attack the government and judicial authorities.’  
 
Prosecutor:  ‘Truthfully summarise your public incitement to subvert the 
government.’  
 
Jiang:  ‘I used the internet and social media tools such as Twitter, Weibo and 
so on to publish texts that attacked the government and judicial 
authorities, and to incite the populace [minzhong] – the online 
populace [wangshang de minzhong] – I mean, the netizens [wangmin] 
– I misled them into hating our country’s current social system and to 
make them also develop thoughts of dissatisfaction with the current 
system and hopes of changing the political system, similar to my own, 
and to pursue the goal of overturning – of subverting the current social 
system.’37 (Boxun 2017, emphases added) 
 
Similarly, in the written ‘statement’ read out by Prosecutor Yu Junwei at the trial hearing 
(one of 74 statements, according to the Prosecutor), Jiang stated, inter alia,  
 
‘My active anti-Party and anti-government behaviour [jiji zhudong de fandang fan 
zhengfu xingwei] also drew attention from certain foreign media, human rights 
officials in the diplomatic services, and foreign organisations – that is, anti-China 
organisations…Especially after the “Jiansanjiang Incident,” I fully realised how the 
foreign anti-China forces [jingwai fanhua shili] through their campaign to bring down 
the [internet] wall [tuiqiang yundong] were seeking to subvert the leadership of the 
Chinese Communist Party [dianfu Zhongguo gongchandang de lingdao]; yet I still 
accommodated them by running so-called “programmes” with funding from foreign 
organisations, engaging in anti-Party and anti-government activities.’ (Boxun 2017: 
38’00’’) 
 
                                                          
37 The ‘defence’ lawyers only provide some statements in mitigation, for example, by suggesting that the effect 
of Jiang’s speech was more limited than suggested and that he was lacking in intention to incite subversion 
during certain time periods. (Boxun 2017, emphases added) 
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In his prepared concluding statement, Jiang, like other 709 defendants, said that he ‘deeply 
repented’ his criminal actions; that his rights had been respected; and that the authorities had 
looked after him very well during his incarceration; he made no mention of the fact that he 
was held incommunicado. He expressed his hope that other ‘so-called rights defenders and 
rights defence lawyers will draw a lesson from my case.’(Boxun 2017: 2’21’’40’’’) Jiang’s 
use of official vocabulary in these passages was alien to his normal way of speaking and 
manner of thinking. As his wife, watching the unfolding trial from the United States where 
she has fled with their daughter, observed (and as the author thought, too), it showed an 
unsettlingly altered person. (Yang 2017) 
As of this writing, the Crackdown continues, and it also continues to generate 
propaganda and contestation. New criminal investigation detentions have taken place. They 
have targeted Yu Wensheng, for example, a lawyer whom Wang Yu had defended when he 
was detained and brutally tortured (Jacobs and Buckley 2015), and who had tried to act on 
her behalf during the 709 Crackdown, as well as the lawyer who tried to be Lawyer Yu’s 
defence lawyer when he was detained in January 2018, only to be detained herself. (Cheung 
2017) None of the victims of the Crackdown could be described as genuinely free, as even 
those released are closely monitored and confined. Some of the victims have received lasting 
damage to their physical or mental health. One of them, not long before their own detention, 
observed that one of the hardest things he was experiencing was a disturbing inability to be 
afraid. (Conversation #130-17-1) One of the first lawyers to be detained in July 2015, Wang 
Quanzhang, has disappeared entirely. (BBC 2018).38  
 
 
Analysing the turn to public repression: political emotion and normative rationality 
 
As I have so far argued, innovative rights advocacy has at times been able to mount real 
political challenges against Chinese government abuses, even though it has resulted in only a 
handful of legal victories. The 709 Crackdown can be understood as a response to this more 
fluid, expressive, sophisticated human rights advocacy. Seen as a process, the 709 
Crackdown and trials discussed here resemble neither the immediately preceding Reform and 
Opening era nor the persecutions of the Mao era.  
 In some ways, the terse and formulaic official documents, wooden performances, and 
spuriousness of the ‘charges’ and ‘convictions,’ of the 709 trials recalled earlier cases of 
human rights lawyers convicted of inciting subversion and other crimes in the Reform and 
Opening era (or more precisely, in the post-June-Fourth era). Like in earlier cases, the 
authorities convicted the defendants of ‘subversion’ and ‘inciting subversion,’ but used 
crimes such as enforced disappearance and torture to obtain ‘evidence’ supporting these 
convictions. 39 Like in earlier trial hearings, they claimed to follow procedural rules, but got 
nowhere near constituting a legal process for the discovery of facts and their correct legal 
assessment, in line with liberal trial standards. (Fuller 1978)  
But in important respects, the 709 trials are markedly different from those of Reform 
and Opening.  Most importantly, earlier trials did not feature televised forced confessions. 
                                                          
38 A defence statement for Wang Quanzhang, on file with author, contains a detailed summary of the case and 
his circumstances as currently understood.  
39 Li Wenzu, the wife of Wang Quanzhang, also commented on how she was put under pressure to persuade 
Wang Quanzhang to admit guilt and incriminate others. (Apple Daily 2016)  
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From the trial of the Gang of Four all through the Reform and Opening era, the Party-State at 
least let defendants speak for themselves, and in most cases allowed them some limited 
access to lawyers helping them. (Lovell 2017) In earlier cases of human rights defenders, too, 
such as that of Gao Zhisheng, Xu Zhiyong and his colleagues, Guo Feixiong, and lawyer 
Tang Jingling, the defendants could plead innocent and make statements to defend 
themselves, although they might be interrupted and cut short. They could in principle also get 
help from genuine criminal defence lawyers, even though their access to them was delayed.  
Defence lawyers and the defendants’ families were harassed and persecuted (no change in 
this regard); but they were not vilified publicly; and reporting of the trials and criminal 
convictions was generally kept to a terse minimum, very different from the TV spectacles put 
on in the context of the 709 Crackdown.  
In yet other ways, the 709 trials also resemble twentieth century show trials,40 or in 
Kirchheimer’s (1961) account of the political trial, ‘the use of legal procedure for political 
ends.’ They were scripted and rehearsed, making the defendants powerless participants in 
their own denunciation. They were public only in one way – they had an audience (Clarke ad 
Feinerman 1995), and they were clearly used for political purposes.  In their generic depiction 
of enemies of society and the enactment of a politically approved view, they could remind 
one of totalitarian show trials and propaganda.  
But, as noted earlier on, the 709 trials and surrounding reporting and propaganda 
showed the state in a different light from earlier show trials. There were no thundering judges 
or prosecutors enacting the rage of the people, like in the Freisler court or in Stalin’s or 
Mao’s show trials, which enacted spectacles of frightening, crushing Party-State power. The 
trials also occurred in an entirely different communicative environment from that of the 
twentieth century. Most importantly, through the social media, the official reporting on these 
show trials could be disseminated – but it could also be challenged almost instantly and both 
in and outside China.    
The 709 Crackdown therefore calls for a broader analysis. The changes in the style of 
advocacy, as well as repression, observed in earlier sections of this essay are not only 
causally related to one another. They also require to be interpreted in light of broader, 
political and legal shifts in the Xi Jinping era. As I argue in the following, the 709 
Crackdown reflects a reconceptualization of law and governance, as well as the deliberate use 
of emotive repression. It also upsets the idea of truth and its function as a regulative ideal in 
legal-political public discourse.  
A first aspect to be discussed is that as numerous law and governance reforms of the 
‘Reform and Opening’ era reflected liberal principles, repression was in many ways hidden 
during this era; only when rights advocates intervened did it become more widely visible, as 
in the Jiansanjiang case. In the 709 Crackdown, this began to change. While the Party-State at 
times still hid its abuses and persisted in claiming that the process was in accordance with 
criminal procedure law, at other times, it seemed as though the authorities wanted to make a 
point of having the power to violate their victims’ legal rights. For example, as discussed, it 
displayed Lawyer Zhou Shifeng just a few days after his detention in a manner flagrantly 
violating the presumption of innocence and strongly suggesting that he had been forced to 
                                                          
40 In the phrase coined in the 1930s, according to the Oxford English Dictionary: ‘a judicial trial held in public 
with the intention of influencing or satisfying public opinion, rather than of ensuring justice. See also Ma (2012) 
on the Bo Xilai and Gu Kailai trials, which might be said to have revived show trials.   
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‘confess’; yet it went to some length to ensure an appearance of lawfulness at his trial several 
months later.  
Practices of alternately following and ignoring procedural legal principles might 
indicate mere inconsistency. But this would not explain why the authorities decided to depart 
from their earlier practice of hiding abuse, and why they chose to display the 709 defendants 
while abusing their rights, when it must have been clear to them what outrage and 
international criticism these displays would attract. It is more plausible that alternating 
between paying lip-service to legality and showing contempt for legality is important to the 
Party-State’s new use of the ‘legal’ process, as projecting, not in any way limiting, public 
power, along Carl-Schmittian lines. (Schmitt 1922) As Vinx has argued, legal norms cannot, 
according to Schmitt, govern extreme cases of exception – and what constitutes such 
exceptional cases is for the sovereign to decide. In other words, governments may ‘switch 
law on and off’ as it sees fit. (Vinx 2014)  
The same shift of attitude can be discerned in several steps the Party-State has taken 
since Xi Jinping’s assumption of his office to undermine not only practices related to right 
protection but also the very idea of respect for basic rights and related liberal and democratic 
values. In 2013, the Party-issued Document Number Nine dismissed the very idea of 
universal values. (ChinaFile 2013)41  In 2014, making this logic more explicit, the Party 
announced that ‘Party Leadership and Socialist Rule of Law are identical;’ (CCP 2014; 
Clarke 2014; Peerenboom 2015) a Carl-Schmittian position echoing attempts by 
conservative, nationalist scholars such as Jiang Shigong to explain party leadership as a fact 
foundational to, rather than disturbing, the constitutional order.(Jiang 2010)  The new 2015 
National Security Law framed the struggle for security as one against foreign and domestic 
enemies, including perceived ‘enemy forces’ within wider Chinese society as well as those 
considered disloyal within the Party. (e.g. Article 2) Also, Article 309 of the Criminal Law, 
as revised in 2015, prohibited 
   
‘insulting, defaming or threatening judicial personnel or litigation participants, and 
not heeding the court's admonitions, seriously disrupting courtroom order’ as well as 
‘other conduct seriously disrupting court order.’   
 
And a Party ‘Opinion’ issued in late 2015 announced that lawyers would in future be 
expected to provide ‘volunteer’ services in litigation-related petitioning work. 42 Volunteers 
so recruited would ‘persuade’ petitioners ‘to submit to the decision and stop bringing 
complaints;’ or at most, if there was any mistake, to ‘make suggestions to the governmental 
and legal authorities so as to propitiate the matter getting resolved through the [proper] legal 
procedure.’ (Party Central Political-Legal Committee 2015) (Emphases added) In other 
words, they would be expected to help the government conciliate their pro bono clients.43  
                                                          
41 Arguably anticipating this shift under Xi Jinping an earlier change to the criminal procedure law, effective 
from 2013, created rules on ‘surveillance in a designated place,’ which suspended crucial protections for 
suspects and the investigation stage of the criminal process. (Chinese Human Rights Defenders 2015) 
42 中央政法委《关于建立律师参与化解和代理涉法涉诉信访案件制度的意见(试行)》[Party Central 
Political-Legal Committee Opinion on Establishing a System for Lawyers to Participate in Resolving and 
Acting as Representatives in Litigation-Related Petitioning Cases (Trial Version)] (10 November 2015), 
available at <http://www.moj.gov.cn/index/content/2015-11/10/content_6348175.htm?node=7337> . 
43 This would bring China (further) into conflict with the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers (1990).  
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In 2016, the Foreign NGO Management Law followed this trend by treating foreign 
civil society organisations as, in principle, suspect. (Lubman 2016; Wong 2016) In early 
2018, finally, the Constitution was changed to extend the presidential term of office: an 
important change of the rules that (as observers were quick to point out) removed one of the 
very few, quite primitive, yet crucial mechanisms the Party had put in place to limit the 
concentration of power. (Rudd 2018)  
 In sum, the rejection of liberal ideas, the heightening of ‘national security,’ the 
weakening of civil society organisations and the legal profession, and the further 
concentration and perpetuation of political power reflected in these new rhetoric and legal 
changes are important aspects of the wider shift that has taken place under Xi Jinping. The 
709 Crackdown must be seen in conjunction with them. As it televises and thereby advertises 
its use of arbitrary means for repressive purposes, the Party-State also presents itself more 
and more in the image of a ‘Dual State’ in the sense of the concept developed by Ernst 
Fraenkel (1941). The conception of law employed by dual states, just because it explicitly 
subordinates law to political power, is not coherent with the idea of rational normativity 
(Vernunftrecht).44  
Xu Youyu, the historian and Cultural Revolution scholar, echoes this point. Asked if 
there is a ‘China model’ being developed, he comments that while the leadership claims to 
have ideas, it does not really have a coherent model of governance. (Tang 2017) Part of Xu’s 
analysis relies on the repressive methods employed by the Party-State under Xi, which he 
compares to fascist but also Stalinist methods. They not only depart from the Reform and 
Opening era but also do not return to the Mao era of mass movements; they can instead, Xu 
argues, be compared to fascist and Stalinist methods. 45 The current Party-State uses neither 
class nor race to create divisions but demands absolute loyalty in Yu’s analysis: failing to 
show absolute loyalty means absolute disloyalty. (Tang 2017)   
Rationality, then, is diminished in the Xi era, along with legal normativity. The 
preceding section examined how the internet and social media have allowed Chinese human 
rights lawyers to engage in novel forms of visual and audio-visual advocacy, even though it is 
not easy to tell if the digital age has empowered human rights advocates and activists in a 
decisive way, since authoritarian systems have also been able to harness this power.46 As the 
709 Crackdown illustrates, the Party-State in its response to novel forms of advocacy has 
made full use of and reciprocated innovative, visual and social media techniques. (brady 
2007; U.S.-China Inistitute 2015; Banurski 2016) 
A second aspect, closely related to the suppression of normative rationality, is the use 
of smart techniques for what might be characterised as a form of emotive repression, or a 
practice of public, repressive, emotive politics. As noted, repression in the 709 Crackdown 
extensively used audio-visual media to vilify the very idea of principled opposition to the 
current Party-State system.   
                                                          
44 Jan-Werner Müller (1999) has argued that Schmitt concurrently used ‘an objective, cold mode that claims to 
discover the hard truths about politics, and a feverish expressionism which aims to identify the enemy and even 
to incite hatred.’ 
45 In this interview, Xu also points to various differences with Nazi Germany  (Tang 2017)  
46 As noted earlier, Rebecca MacKinnon, for example, has used the phrase ‘networked authoritarianism’ to 
describe a form of governance where people can ‘call attention to social problems or injustices and even manage 
to have an impact on government policies,’ but not advocate fundamental change of the system, and where paid 
individuals pose as citizen participants in online public debates. (MacKinnon 2011; Mokhtad and Monshipouri 
2016: 5; Yang 2009; Svensson 2013; Svensson 2016) 
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One might primarily expect displays of frightful power, of the atomised nothingness 
of the individual who has dared to resist, from the propaganda of a neo-totalitarian system. 
One might think, for example, of the Nazi German Freisler court’s depictions of raging 
humiliation of its ‘traitors’ standing trial.47 Yet in the 709 propaganda, the fearsome power of 
the state is not predominantly what we are meant to see. While being shown some courtroom 
scenes in which an average-sized human rights defender defendant is outsized by the large, 
muscular court police officers flanking him, the trial propaganda videos mainly project the 
impersonal, incorruptible and correct functioning of the legal process and its main Party-State 
actors, the court, prosecution and compliant ‘defence lawyers.’ Many particularly ‘touching’ 
scenes in official video recordings, by contrast, involve close-ups of the ‘culprits’ breaking 
up and expressing feelings of guilt, remorse, repentance, and gratitude, as discussed earlier 
on.  
The message such enactments seem to send is therefore not so much about the 
devastating power of the Party-State that can persecute and destroy, as about the benevolence 
of the Party-State that allows the repentant to confess and reaffirm their loyalty. It tells 
audiences, it seems, that they must not leave the fold of obedience and loyalty that is 
expected of them, as the price for security. Televising ‘confessions’ and self-criticisms 
amplifies these effects, but also mitigates them by suggesting that a return into the fold of 
Party-State care is possible.48  
In this context, the terrors the authorities hold in store for their ‘enemies’ are shown 
only indirectly. They are expressed in the language the ‘culprits’ such as Wang Yu and Jiang 
Tianyong have been forced to use. Some of the traces of these terrors are displayed, as when 
Wang Yu and her husband and fellow lawyer Bao Longjun are shown to break down over the 
news about their son, or when recent torture victims are shown in a state of disorientation, of 
not being like their former selves.49 Televising the defendants’ subjugation and coerced 
cooperation may have unsettling effects, but mainly for those who still put up rational 
resistance to these displays, for example, by questioning how rights defence lawyers have 
been made to produce their ‘confessions.’  
Where human rights defenders are shown as enemies, on the other hand – outside the 
context of the show trial videos -- their images are mixed with those of foreign enemies and 
the suffering these produce among victims, in a manner resembling sophisticated (if 
shameless) contemporary media adverts. In the ‘Colour Revolution’ video clip, for example, 
pictures of American soldiers and victims among the populations of Iraq and Syria alternate 
for mere seconds with images of rights defence lawyers in action, holding up banners, or 
standing in the courtroom while presenting an argument. Characteristically, in these 
instances, the rights defenders cannot be heard speaking, and as mentioned earlier on, even 
the banners they display are not legible.  
                                                          
47 Although it appears that these were deemed so offensive to a common sense of fairness and decency that even 
that regime would not use them for propaganda purposes. Goebbels recognised that the footage produced for the 
planned film ‘Verräter vor dem Volksgericht [Traitors before the People’s Court]’ would generate compassion 
toward the victims, rather than applause for the system that had executed them. (Amann 2004). (The failed 
resistance movement of 1944 in fact included women and men.)  
48 As Pruce (2016: 52) points out when considering the uses of images in visual repression contexts, ‘Since 
[such] imagery captures the likeness of individuals and articulates suffering and repression, there is an inherent 
risk that through its production and dissemination, vulnerability is reproduced as indignity. In the very process 
of seeking support, frailty may be communicated through stereotypes and motifs that exacerbate humiliation.’ 
49 ‘Pain defines reality for the person who suffers it, with all else, even language, being destroyed.’ (Scarry 1985) 
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These findings throw some light on the broader discussion of political emotion, by the 
evidence they provide on what happens when political emotion is engendered and used by 
illiberal regimes. In her account of the topic, Martha Nussbaum focuses on the cultivation of 
desirable political emotions – emotions that ‘take as their object the nation, the nation’s goals, 
its institutions and leaders, its geography, and one’s fellow citizens seen as fellow inhabitants 
of a common public space’ --, tempered and scrutinised by critical rationality, in liberal 
democracies. (Nussbaum 2013: 2) Pointing out ‘that emotions necessarily involve cognitive 
appraisals, forms of value-laden perception and/or thought directed at an object or objects,’ 
she argues that in a desirable political system, political emotion complements arguments and 
general norms. (Nussbaum 2013: 17)  
 
‘[T]he public culture cannot be tepid and passionless, if good principles and 
institutions are to survive: it must have enough episodes of inclusive love, enough 
poetry and music, enough access to a spirit of affection and play, that people’s 
attitudes to one another and the nation they inhabit are not mere dead routine. 
(Nussbaum 2013: 319-20) 
 
Nothing in the use of emotion in the 709 Crackdown suggests that Nussbaum is wrong about 
the role of political emotions such as love of country in liberal democracies. But this 
crackdown reminds us forcefully that the cultivation of political emotion can occur entirely 
without mitigation by critical rationality. In fact, as the 709 Crackdown reminds us, political 
emotion is particularly well-suited to abuse by anti-democratic and anti-liberal systems 
pursuing a romanticisation of their own power.  
 A third, related, aspect of public repression in the 709 Crackdown is the particular 
way in which it can upset the belief that truth matters, or inculcate the belief that ‘truth’ is 
only a matter of power. There can be little doubt, for one thing, that audiences aware of the 
crackdown’s background or willing to ask critical questions might have been fooled by its 
false statements, in particular those provided in TV ‘confessions.’ 50 A wider audience, on the 
other hand, might be willing to accept the force of what one ‘sees with one’s own eyes’ and 
to trust the ‘evidence’ of their senses without critical reflection.51  It might be willing to 
accept the message that the legal process against the State’s enemies was orderly, impersonal, 
and just, and that repentant culprits could be treated ‘leniently.’ Yet would this have justified 
the cost and effort associated with staging and producing the 709 trials and surrounding 
propaganda? After all, the Chinese audience surely already knew that the Party-State must be 
loved (ai guo ai dang), not opposed.  
                                                          
50 Towards human rights defenders and their circles, who were broadly aware of the circumstances of their 
production, the coerced statements of course lacked credibility.  They failed – as a social media commentator in 
one of the chat-groups established amongst human rights defenders noted – to satisfy the criteria of a non-
coerced statement. (Message posted 2 August 2016, on file with author)  In the author’s longer-term observation, 
finding out that a rights defender or other oppositional figure has broken down under pressure tends to set off a 
debate among their supporters – it leaves some looking for exculpatory explanations, while others, distressed, 
fearful, and angry, tend to recriminate those who broke down.  One commentator suggested that Wang Yu, for 
example, must have been beaten into making her statement ‘correctly’ and that this was why her face looked 
unnaturally swollen.  Screen-shot (2 August 2016) on file with author. These accounts call to mind the use of 
‘confessions’ and ‘statements of repentance’ in earlier crackdowns (Pils 2014: chapter 6; see also Guo 2016; 
Jiang 2016)  
51 Rather like in Václav Havel’s greengrocer example, the official reporting offers an opportunity to those who 
wish or need to take it up, to ‘conceal from themselves the low origins of their obedience.’ (Havel 1978) 
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The propaganda’s further, underlying message lies in its emphatic assertions of the 
truth of their content and denunciation of challenges as lies, juxtaposing false ‘truths’ with 
false accusations of lying. Not only are the defendants compelled to admit the untruth of their 
truthful allegations as rights advocates -- Lawyer Jiang Tianyong, for example, was forced to 
state that he lied about the 709 Crackdown, and a central element of the crime he is accused 
of, inciting subversion of the power of the state, consists in ‘slander.’ Also, the accompanying 
propaganda outputs, such as the animated cartoon and the ‘Colour Revolution’ video-clip, 
keep making references to the untruthfulness of those they cast as enemies, and the Party-
State’s resolute struggle against them. The fact that defendants were forced to renounce their 
principles and, at least in some cases, to lie – for example, in Lawyer Jiang’s case, about 
‘fabricating’ his colleague’s account of torture -- was not merely irrelevant to the 
effectiveness of the message being sent. On the contrary, it was particularly powerful by 
attacking their public persona and political identity. This in turn also helped the Party-State 
project its ‘warning’ against trying to resist to other rights defenders, showing how 
disturbingly resisters would be segregated as outlaws. 
In sum, taken together, the audio-visual content produced by the Party-State in the 
context of the 709 Crackdown is an example of overt and publicly manifest repression.52 In 
the case observed, repression makes particular use of emotions. Of course, repression is 
generally associated with the idea of subduing someone or something by force (Oxford 
English Dictionary), whereas audio-visual content does not apply physical force. In the 
examples considered, however, the images captured the results of state-orchestrated violence; 
and they constructed, propagated and imposed a narrative of the 709 cases that no one was 
allowed to question.53  
In the three aspects discussed here – anti-liberal rules and practices, the use of 
emotion, and the upsetting of truth – the sophisticated repression techniques used contrast 
sharply with the advocacy techniques to which they respond. Propaganda in the context of the 
709 Crackdown is not bounded by the rationality of rights-based claims; rather, it creates a 
fiction that is ‘authoritatively’ propagated to suppress the truth, undermining the values of 
authenticity and facticity. (Lifton 1961) It calls to mind the way Hannah Arendt described the 






This article has argued that the shift from verbal to visual and audio-visual communication 
that is a central feature of the 21st century has affected not only the way Chinese rights 
defenders advocate ‘bottom up,’ but also the way the Chinese government communicates 
repressive messages ‘top down.’ In both cases, this shift is a move from rationality to 
emotionality. However, visual human rights advocacy remains largely bounded by the 
rationality of what it defends: rights, conceived in liberal terms.  
                                                          
52 A taxonomy of forms of repression is provided by Jennifer Earl (2003:48). 
53 The case of Jiang Tianyong and other lawyers defending 709 detainees illustrated that those who questioned it 
risked being caught up in the repressive cycle of the 709 Crackdown themselves. Another later victim of this 
cycle is Lawyer Li Yuhan (李昱函) became the most recent victim. (Frontline Defenders 2017)  
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By contrast, the overt and public, physical, verbal, visual and audio-visual forms of 
repression discussed here convey a political message that undermines the legal protection of 
individuals from abuses, and thus also undermines the rule of law.  The production of these 
messages is part of a move toward smarter and more effective techniques of repression. 
Producing and exploiting emotions such as fear, it helps the projection of messages that 
supplant the rationalist and liberal conception of law that characterised the Reform and 
Opening era with an anti-rationalist and anti-liberal romanticisation of power. Rather than 
diminishing the role of law as ideologically illegitimate, as the Party did under Mao, the 
current regime seeks to integrate repression into the legal system, locking up and torturing 
more and more critics, and benefiting from new methods of generating and disseminating its 
repressive messages, as seen in the 709 Crackdown. 
In doing so, the system produces effects beyond China’s borders, not only because the 
immediate targets of repression include foreigners, but also because repressive messages, 
especially non-verbal ones, travel so easily across national borders.54 This transnational 
dimension of repression creates special risks of succumbing to the repressive mechanisms 
that already operate domestically, as observed above. In the context of the 709 Crackdown, 
for example, when in 2016, the American Bar Association (ABA) hesitated to make a 
statement on the 709 Crackdown on human rights lawyers, it seemed plausible that it might 
have taken into account the risks to its established ‘Rule of Law Initiative’ programmes in 
China, an impression that was compounded when the ABA withdrew its offer to publish a 
Chinese human rights lawyer’s book. (Fish 2015) Following public criticism, the ABA 
awarded lawyer Wang Yu a human rights prize, which, as discussed, led to its being cast as 
an enemy organisation in a scripted interview with Wang Yu. (ChinaChange 2016) 55  Similar 
dynamics have played out on many occasions, reinforced by new rules apparently intended to 
create divides between acceptable, but heavily controlled, and vilified and rejected foreign 
civil society organisations.  
Yet it remains difficult to see how the Chinese Party-State could win a war on civil 
society, or against the legal principles it recognised, at least on paper, in an earlier era. In part 
at least, this would be difficult due to the same transnational interconnectedness that also 
facilitates repression. While resembling 20th century ideas and practices in some respects, the 
system’s novel repressive practices occur in a globally more inter-connected world and in a 
far less centrally controlled communicative environment. The discussion of this crackdown 
here, for example, has also made frequent references to the work of organisations gathering 
and disseminating information on this crackdown. These not only helped to keep individuated 
advocacy on behalf of the 709 detainees alive; they also keep challenging the official 
narrative. Because both repression and advocacy now move more easily across national 
borders, civil society in and outside China can resist its divisive dynamic by refusing to be 
cast as enemies of the system that persecutes its human rights defenders. 
  
                                                          
54 In the instances discussed here, especially that of Peter Dahlin’s ‘TV confession,’ the message was verbal and 
audio-visual.  See also Ludwig and Walker (2017).   
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